Ethics

Reason has another practical interest, in addition to the individual interest of each subject, because it also has the function of guiding the behavior of the spiritual animal as a whole. The goals of the spiritual animal are good for rational beings in the same way as the goals of individual rational subjects, and there is also a difference in the goals pursued by spiritual animals between necessary and optional goals. But since all these goals, necessary and optional for both individual subjects and spiritual animals, are goals pursued by rational subjects according to arguments that evolve by rational selection, there must be priorities among them. Those priorities are set by rules of morality and rules of justice, and both sets of rules are good for reason in the same way, that is, by contributing to the natural perfection of reason.

What is good for spiritual animals is not necessarily the same as what is good for rational subjects, because spiritual animals evolve by reproductive causation on the social level of biological organization at the same time that rational subjects evolve by reproductive causation on the individual (or multicellular) level of biological organization. Though they depend on one another for their existence, each approaches the natural perfection for organisms of its own kind. At the same time that spiritual animal are becoming naturally perfect as social level animals made of rational subjects as parts, rational subjects become naturally perfect as multicellular level animals that live as parts of spiritual animals.

As a higher level of biological organization, spiritual animals depend for their existence on the coordination of rational subjects as lower level organisms. But the part-whole relation that holds between the spiritual animal and its members is, as we have seen, different from that between the multicellular animal and the cells that are it parts.

In both cases, what is good for the whole is usually good for the parts (because they are parts of the whole), but it can sometimes be bad for the parts as well. For example, the good of the whole sometimes requires the sacrifice of some of its parts. In spiritual animals, this happens in warfare, when some individuals must die, and in multicellular animals, the death of cells is a normal part of the process of development, for example, in the nervous system.

But there is a difference in how the good for the parts is related to the good of the whole. In both cases, it is generally true that what is good for the parts is also good for the whole, because the whole is made up of the parts and depends on them for its own existence. Indeed, in multicellular animals, what is good for the cell is never bad for the whole, because the only way that goals can be naturally selected for a cell is by the success of the multicellular whole in reproducing, that is, by natural selection at the higher level of biological organization. The cells cannot complete reproductive cycles on their own, independently of the multicellular reproductive cycle. In spiritual animals, however, what is good for the rational subject may be bad for the spiritual animal of which it is part, because its goals are naturally selected for the rational subject by how they contribute to individual reproduction, not just the reproduction of the spiritual animal as a whole. That is, individuals do reproduce independently of the reproduction of their spiritual animal. Thus, for example, some of the goals that rational subjects pursue because they contribute to their individual interest may be immoral or treacherous and, thus, harmful to the spiritual animal.

Instead of subordinating the good of the part to the good of the whole, therefore, the good for the individual and the good for spiritual animal are on a par. They are good for the same kinds of reasons, though on different levels of biological organization. And they are both good for the rational subject, for he is the agent of rational beings generally (that is, for the individual, the spiritual animal, and as we shall see, even for the world as a whole). Thus, individual and spiritual goals are both goals of the self, as the four-dimensional being that one constructs by his rational actions over a lifetime, and conflicts between individual and spiritual self interest must be resolved, or else reason will not be able to serve its function. They are resolved, as we shall see, by a symmetrical subordination of the good of each for the good of the other.

Spiritual animals pursue goals by way of institutions that generate social level behavior. (Institutions are patterns of interaction among members guided by low-level practical arguments about social roles and their duties, prerogatives and interrelationships, and their functions are the social level behavior they generate.) When choices must be made among social level goals, it is the function of political institutions, or government, to make the choice for the spiritual animal. And parallel to rational subjects, there is a difference between goals that are necessary and goals that are optional.

Spiritual animals have necessary goals. Goals that control conditions that affect the reproduction of the spiritual animal as a whole are necessary goals. Though spiritual animals, unlike multicellular animals, can continue to exist indefinitely without reproducing, there are nonetheless relevant conditions to be controlled. They must be able to reproduce, if the occasion arises, in order to be naturally perfect. Though reproduction is not a necessary goal of spiritual animals, it is the criterion of which other goals are necessary. And among their necessary goals, two kinds can be distinguished, because the social level behavior in pursuit of goals can be directed either at objects external to the spiritual animal or at its own members.

External necessary goals of spiritual animals are analogous to those of multicellular animals, except for warfare, the new kind of behavior that spiritual animals have toward one another.

Like multicellular animals, spiritual animals must acquire from nature the free energy and other resources they need to fuel their reproductive cycles (This aspect of the economic institution corresponds to feeding in other animals.) Spiritual animals must also protect themselves from natural hazards such as predators, storms and other disasters. And just as multicellular animals must mate, nomadic spiritual animals, at least, must maintain relations to other spiritual animals (such as membership in tribes) by which its members can mate outside their own spiritual animal.

The non-analogous goals arise from group-level natural selection of spiritual animals by war. The overriding goal of a spiritual animal in dealing with other spiritual animals is to wining at war with them, which involves making the best choice about whether (and how) to live peacefully or to engage in war relative to other spiritual animals with which it interacts.

Internal goals of animal behavior are unique to spiritual animals, because in spiritual animals, the animal behavior guidance system also serves as the biological behavior guidance system, that is, as the mechanism that coordinates the behavior of the lower level organisms of which it is composed. Thus, social level animal behavior must serve many of the same functions as the biological behavior guidance system in multicellular animals.

The economic institution also includes internal functions, such as coordinating the productive behavior of members and distributing the products, just as acquiring energy requires digestion and circulation in multicellular animals. Likewise, the government includes executive institutions that administer regulations, just as the brain has nervous connections to the rest of the body. But it also includes an institution for enforcing laws by punishment, which is analogous to the immune system in multicellular animals. The kinship system gives individuals locations in the spiritual body, corresponding to a process of embryological development for determining cells to certain parts of the body. Educational and religious institutions acculturate the members to the arguments that will guide their behavior, just as the endocrine system and parasympathetic nervous system guide the behavior of individual cells.

Some goals of internal behavior have no analogue in multicellular animals. For example, spiritual animals may have institutions that mediate the exchange of arguments and promote cultural evolution, such as academic, scholarly, and research institutions. Nothing like cultural evolution takes place in multicellular animals.

Some internal goals of social level behavior are especially relevant to practical reason because they have to do with controlling the pursuit of individual goals. The health of the spiritual animal requires that its members observe moral rules that limit the pursuit of the individual interests, for unless they are observed, members will not be willing and able to cooperate in generating social level behavior.

The content of moral rules is determined as the conclusions of practical arguments about how individuals should behave in situations that affect others or the spiritual animal as a whole. As we have seen, they include rules that require everyone to cooperate in generating social level behavior (including prohibition of treason and other crimes against the spiritual animal).They also include rules that prevent members from harming one another, rules that enable members to cooperate with one another (such as the duty of fidelity in promises and contracts) and facilitate cooperative attitudes (such as the duty of reciprocity in gift giving and civility.

Because practical arguments evolve when they are rationally selected by everyone, as we have seen, the rules tend to be the rules that maximize the good of the whole (as the utilitarians hold), that maximize the freedom of everyone (that is, minimize the limits they impose on the pursuit of individual goals, as the contractarians hold), and treat members equally (as Kantians insist).

The spiritual animal must act as a whole on its members to ensure that moral rules are followed. Violations of moral rules arouse anger in those who are hurt, and the motives selected for fighting wars tend to take the form of revenge and vendettas within spiritual animals, unless measures are taken to restore the moral equilibrium. The institutions that have traditionally served this function are the religious institutions, which publicly affirm and defend the principles on which other practical arguments are based, and the justice system (including the police and judicial system), which punish wrongdoing. (The former is part of the educational systems, analogous to the endocrine and parasympathetic nervous system in multicellular animals, whereas the justice system corresponds to the immune system, which kills mis-functioning cells in the body as well as invaders.)

Though many violations of moral rules are naturally sanctioned by the disapproval of other members, some violations of moral rules are so harmful and cause so much warlike antagonism that they are prohibited by laws, and retributive justice is reserved for them. Punishment of crime is a necessary goal of spiritual animals, if only because taking revenge on the individual level leads to civil war.

Rational subjects, therefore, insofar as they are responsible for selecting and generating social level behavior, ought to choose to pursue these goals. The attainment of these goals contributes to the natural perfection of the spiritual animal, because it controls the conditions that affect its reproduction as a whole. These goals are, therefore, good for reason in its function of guiding the behavior of the spiritual animal.

In response to Moore’s open question argument, therefore, it will not make sense for rational beings who understand the nature of reason and its place in the natural world to ask, But is what contributes to the natural perfection of spiritual animals good?

The pursuit of these necessary goals is also part of the wisdom that Socrates was seeking, because this ontological explanation of the nature of goodness explains why necessary goals are good for the spiritual animal.

There are optional goals of spiritual interest. Just as individuals can pursue goals because they are good even when they do not control conditions that affect individual reproduction, so spiritual animals can pursue goals that are good when they do not control conditions that affect its social level reproduction. Though in both cases the goal must already be good in some way (by contributing to the natural perfection of something, including artifacts), the goal becomes good for reason because it is chosen.

For the spiritual animal to pursue optional goals, a general consensus about them is normally required, because they are not necessary and pursuing them will involve the cost of generating social level behavior. But since there are goals that it would be good for spiritual animals to pursue, it is possible to make them good for spiritual animals by choosing them.

Though it is a necessary goal of spiritual animals to protect the environment from the damage of its own economic activity enough to survive indefinitely into the future, an optional goal might be to preserve as many species and ancient ecologies as possible in order to insure the diversity of life on earth.

It is a necessary goal of spiritual animals to make sure that they will win any wars they may fight, since that is a condition that affects their reproduction as a whole. But an optional goal would be to work together with other spiritual animals to end group level natural selection by war. That would require the control of population growth everywhere on the planet, including perhaps even decreasing it, since that is the basic cause of war and would eventually lead to war, unless it is controlled. Under such conditions it might be possible for spiritual animals to end war by cooperating in an international military force to protect national boundaries and prevent spiritual animals from harming one another. (Insofar as there are traits that spiritual animals would otherwise evolve by such group level natural selection which make them more perfect, it might also be necessary for spiritual animals to assume responsibility for giving spiritual animals those powers by other means.)

Natural selection at the individual level continues after a fashion within spiritual animals by success in individual reproduction, but it is significantly curtailed by modern medicine and where it is still at work, it involves much suffering. Thus, an optional goal for spiritual animals would be to replace natural selection with germ line intervention in order to eliminate genetic diseases and to enhance the powers that enable rational subjects to attain the goals they ought to pursue. For example, each couple could be given the option of adding or deleting certain genes from their offspring, and since they would choose what is best for their children, it would be decentralized process much like natural selection in which rational subjects could be expected to evolve further in the direction of natural perfection for organisms of their kind. It would be to replace natural selection at the individual level with rational selection.

Traditional optional goals have included building monuments. But a more up to date goal that may be optional for spiritual animals is space exploration and colonizing the rest of the planetary system. But there are other possible goals. In each case, it is not clear at this point in evolution whether these goals are optional or necessary. That is why the future course of evolution is not just a conclusion of theoretical reason, but with the evolution of reason’s ontological self-understanding, depends on where practical reasoning leads reason in the situations that arise.

The pursuit of goals of the spiritual animal may conflict with the rational subject’s pursuit of individual goals, and since they are both goals of rational beings, there is a conflict among goals that needs to be resolved.

The individual interest and the spiritual interest are equal, because they are good in parallel ways, that is, each by contributing to the natural perfection of the organism (or primary structure) on its own level of biological organization, and ontological philosophy provides no grounds for preferring one over the other. Both are equally the responsibility of reason, or goals pursued by reflective subjects as the agents of reason, and thus, it is a conflict between one's individual self interest and one's spiritual self interest.

When individual and spiritual goals conflict, what ought to exist for reason is what contributes to the natural perfection of reason as the behavior guidance system for both biological levels, that is, for the rational subject as a rational being. But what are those priorities.

Moral rules are generally assumed to take priority over the pursuit of individual goals. Indeed, that is their function: moral rules are meant to limit the pursuit of individual self interest. The general observance of moral rules is, as we have seen, a necessary goal of spiritual animals, for spiritual animals cannot pursue social level goals except by coordinating the behavior of its members and their ability to cooperate in pursuit of such goals depends on the members being moral in their relations to one another. But when moral rules do conflict with the pursuit of individual self interest, why should the rational subject be moral?

Let us recall the answers to this question at earlier points in evolution. Answers at the stage of rational spiritual animals are based on religion, but the answers given by epistemological philosophy are no more adequate.

Rational culture evolves arguments to justify the principles on which its practical arguments are based, and they generally have to do with explanations of the origin of the world, the place of rational beings in it, and the purpose in their existence. These arguments serve the function of mutually acknowledging the validity of the culture of one’s spiritual animal, but they are not rationally compelling. Religious beliefs are typically about gods or superior beings of some kind, which may be interpreted as representations of the spiritual animal and its interest. But in order to justify being moral, rather than pursuing their individual interest (or acting on emotion), they merely assert the priority of spiritual interest over individual interest. Though it may be obvious that being moral is in the spiritual interest, that is, good for the group as a whole, religion does not explain why the spiritual interest is prior to the individual interest.

Philosophical culture has attempted to give a deeper justification of moral rules. In the ancient and medieval period and continuing long into the modern period, the belief was that the reason for being moral, as well as the content of moral rules, has to do with something about the nature of goodness and, thus, is objective. Plato thought that the nature of goodness is explained by the existence of The Good Itself as the source of the other Forms — and, thus, of the goodness of visible objects that participate in the Forms as well. That was meant to explain why rational subjects ought to be moral in a way that would satisfy Socrates, that is, by making rational subjects virtuous. But Plato could never explain the nature of The Good Itself in a way that showed how it made other Forms good, much less why rational subjects should be moral.

It was possible to preserve Plato’s belief in the objective nature of goodness in the medieval period (and the early modern period) despite the inability to give an adequate explanation of the nature of goodness. The Christian view, in its most mature form, holds that it is God who understands the nature of goodness, whereas finite rational beings like us cannot. That is, God's ultimate purposes are said to be inscrutable. Insofar as we do not understand why we ought to be moral, therefore, we must so as a matter of faith. Though it is a faith that there is something about the nature of goodness from a God’s Eye point of view that makes morality prior to individual interest, it is still not reason that explains why we ought to be moral.

In the modern period, attempts to give a naturalistic explanation of the goodness of morality that would explain why we ought to be moral were ultimately failures. Hobbes, as a social contractarian, attempted to explain the content of moral rules as the result of a contract in which every rational subject gives up only as much freedom as is required to protect individuals generally from harming one another and enabling them to cooperate. But since that did not explain why the individual should not be immoral in pursuing his individual interest after the social contrast was signed and he could avoid being punished, it did not explain adequately why the morally good is good.

Kant attempted to explain the content of moral rules as what is required by universalizability, that is, his categorical imperative (that we should act only on those maxims that we can will to be a universal law of nature). But that left Kant with no way to show that individuals ought to be moral, because it did not give the individual any reason for choosing not to be rational in that sense, and being rational only in the sense of pursuing is rational individual interest. Kant suggested that the reason stems from something uniquely valuable about rational subjects, that is, as ends in themselves, but he was never able to explain what that was, except to suggest that is has something to do with the unknown (noumenal) nature of rational subjects and to suggest that freedom from pursuing goals set by one’s desires, or what he called “autonomy,” is somehow better.

Utilitarians, such as Bentham and Mill, explained the content of moral rules as what promotes the general happiness, but they too failed to explain why the rational subject should be moral. They assumed that the individual subject cannot help but pursue his individual happiness, but they were never able to explain why the individual should prefer the general happiness to his own happiness when they came into conflict.

Ontological philosophy does, however, explain why we should be moral. Its explanation of the nature of rational beings and the nature of goodness explains not only the content of moral rules, as we have seen, but also why the individual rational subject should take moral rules as prior to individual interest. The foundation of the priority of moral rules is that the spiritual interest is one of the basic interests of the rational subject. Because of the nature of reason and the way in which it works, the individual has, as a rational being, responsibility for guiding the behavior of the spiritual animal as well as his own individual behavior.

Reason evolved originally, as we have seen, with the function of guiding the behavior of spiritual animals to make reliable choices about war and peace. But since it works by the exchange of practical arguments among members and their rational selection by individual rational subjects (that is, the selection of arguments from among the alternatives that make their world views maximally coherent), it could also be used to guide individual behavior. In the case of guiding the behavior of the spiritual animal, however, not only the discovery of what is good, but also the selection and generation of social level behavior depends on the members coming to agree about what the spiritual animal ought to do (though, in practice, social level behavior may be guided by political institutions that are maintained by mutual agreement about the practical arguments that generate them). Given the way that reason functions as a behavior guidance system for the spiritual animal, therefore, the rational subject has, as a rational being, an interest in pursuing the goals of the spiritual animal. The rational subject is responsible for social level behavior and they contribute to the natural perfection of the whole of which he is part. And being moral is the most basic way that the individual contributes to the natural perfection of his spiritual animal.

It should be emphasized that the spiritual interest of the rational subject is different from his individual self interest in the spiritual animal because of how he depends on it as the means to pursuing his individual goals. First of all, the spiritual animal is the whole of which he is part, the context of all his activity, and thus, his welfare depends on its welfare. But furthermore, most of the goals he pursues depend on having the use of a spiritual body, as well as a physical body (in the sense that the means involve the cooperation of other members of his spiritual animal). Since his spiritual body is a most powerful means to attaining goals that are good for him as an individual, the individual has another interest in the good of the spiritual animal. But this is not his spiritual self interest. It is his individual self interest in his spiritual animal as the whole of which he is part and his individual self interest in having the use of a spiritual body.

Thus, the subject has necessarily, as a rational being, a spiritual self interest distinct from his individual self interest. And being moral is in his spiritual interest. But it may seem that it is not possible for ontological philosophy to explain why the rational subject ought to be moral, because when moral rules require limiting the pursuit of individual goals, there is a conflict between his two basic interests. They are equal interests, according to ontological philosophy, because they both arise in the same way (by contributing to the natural perfection of the organism on its level of biological organization) and the rational subject is responsible for both. They do come into conflict, because moral rules are meant to limit the pursuit of individual goals. It may seem, therefore, that ontological philosophy is inherently unable to explain why he ought prefer on to the other.

There is, however, a sufficient reason for being moral, because there is a simple and straightforward optimal resolution of this conflict which comes from recognizing the difference between necessary and optional goals of individual self interest. That is, submitting to moral rules is good for the rational subject because it contributes to the natural perfection of the whole of which the rational subject.

It is a necessary goal of the spiritual animal that its members observe moral rules, because that is a condition that affects its reproduction as a whole. The spiritual animal cannot act at all unless morality prevails, because that relationship among its parts is essential to its health.

On the other side, it is not a necessary goal for the individual to act contrary to moral rules. Moral rules limit the means the individual uses to attain individual goals, but they do not prevent him from attaining his necessary goals, at least, not in a healthy spiritual animal. In healthy spiritual animals, individuals are able to attain their necessary goals by moral means, if they make a reasonable effort. Thus, necessary individual goals never conflict with the necessary spiritual goal of being moral. Though moral rules may limit how the individual pursues necessary individual goals, that is merely to constrain his pursuit of his optional individual goals, for there are other ways to attain them and one way is good for the individual only because he chooses it.

To be sure, moral rules may make it impossible to pursue some optional goals at all. But since optional goals are good for the individual only because he chooses them, the individual can contribute to the natural perfection of the whole of which he is part by constraining his choices of optional goals in such a way that his pursuit of them does not involve the violation of moral rules. That is not a severe limitation on individual interest, because there are so many good goals to choose from in making goals good for himself. Thus, there is obviously a best way to maximize the attainment of the goals that are good for rational subjects, including both his individual and his spiritual self interest, and it involves being moral.

This implies, however, that in situations where following moral rules would make it impossible to attain the necessary goals of individual interest with a reasonable effort, it is not wrong to violate moral rules. But that is not surprising, because when the spiritual animal is not healthy enough to continue to exist, it does not contribute to the natural perfection of the whole of which the individual is part to pursue the goals that are necessary for the spiritual animal.

Rational subjects ought, therefore, to observe moral limits on their pursuit of individual goals, because it contributes to the natural perfection of the whole of which the rational subject is part. In this case, however, the whole is a unique combination of animals (or primary structures) at two different levels of biological organization, because the rational subject, as the agent of reason, is responsible for both. The priority of morality is a necessary goal of the spiritual animal (in virtue of controlling a condition that affects its reproduction as a whole), and since it does not conflict with any necessary goal of individual interest, being moral is what contributes to the natural perfection of their combination. Thus, it is good for rational subjects to take morality as prior to their individual interest.

In response to Moore’s open question argument, once again, it will not make sense for rational beings who understand the nature of reason and its place in the natural world to ask, But is what contributes to the natural perfection of both spiritual animals and their members good?

This reason for being moral is also part of the wisdom that Socrates was seeking, because this ontological explanation of the nature of goodness explains why the priority of moral rules is good for the rational subject.

What makes this an adequate explanation of why it is good for the rational subject to be moral is the assumption that moral rules do not conflict with the attainment of necessary goals of his individual self interest. But morality is not the only way that his spiritual interest can conflict with his individual interest. The pursuit of optional goals of the spiritual animal may conflict with the rational subject’s pursuit of necessary goals of individual interest, and thus, there is another conflict among goals that needs to be resolved.

Conflicts clearly do occur between goals of the spiritual animal and the necessary goals of the individual. Spiritual animals often find it useful to sacrifice some of its members in pursuing its social level goals, especially in civilized societies, where a class structure gives some members enormous power over other members, and in mass societies, where subgroups are historically antagonistic with one another. The history of oppression shows that this possibility has been actualized far too often.

One kind of conflict between spiritual and individual goals is so basic to the existence of both, however, that its burden on individuals cannot be counted as contrary to the necessary goals of individual self interest. That is the need of individual members to risk their lives in war. War is the inevitable form of group level natural selection that is responsible for the evolution of rational spiritual animals, and thus, neither spiritual animals nor rational beings can exist without accepting the burdens of fighting. The sacrifice of individuals in war does not, therefore, conflict with the attainment of necessary goals of individual self interest in the relevant sense.

The same may be said about dealing with natural disasters, insofar as group level action that sacrifices individual members is required to control conditions that affect the reproduction of the spiritual animal as a whole.

The rules of justice are meant to limit spiritual animals in the pursuit of its social goals in order to protect the rights of individuals. They are generally formulated in terms of inviolable individual rights because they are meant to protect individual rational subjects from being sacrificed unnecessarily in the pursuit of spiritual goals. Such rights include the most basic means by which rational subjects pursue goals of individual interest, both necessary and optional. Such rights include all the means the rational subject must have in order to attain necessary goals of their individual interest, and there are two general classes of them: basic liberties and distributive justice.

Basic liberties. Rational subjects must have the basic means required to attain necessary goals and lead a normal life, including the right to lead one’s life free from unreasonable arrest or other unnecessary restrictions, the right to speak, associate and contract with other people in public, the right to hold the beliefs that one takes to be true, the right to an equal opportunity to pursue optional goals and the like.

Distributive justice. Rational subjects must have enough economic power to be able, with a reasonable effort, to provide the material conditions of life, including the means for attaining necessary goals, such as food, shelter, medicine, and the capacity to have a normal social life.

But when spiritual goals do conflict with necessary goals of individual self interest, why should the spiritual animal observe rules of justice? This is the mirror image of the issue about the priority of moral rules over the pursuit of goals of individual interest. We are asking why the rules of justice are prior to the pursuit of goals of spiritual self interest?

All the goals are goals for reason, that is, for rational subjects acting in their capacity as the behavior guidance system for both the individual and spiritual animal, and what ought to exist depends on what contributes to the natural perfection of the whole, including both the spiritual animal and its members.

The individual self interest and the spiritual self interest are equal, because they are good in parallel ways, that is, each by contributing to the natural perfection of the organism (or primary structure) on its level of biological organization, and ontological philosophy provides no grounds for preferring one over the other. Both are equally the responsibility of reason.

What makes an optimal balance of individual and spiritual interests possible is that the necessary goals of individual and spiritual self interest can both normally be attained without conflict. After all, spiritual animals are viable organisms. They could not have evolved in the first place unless groups of multicellular animals with coordinated behavior were better able to control the conditions affecting both reproduction on both the individual and social level.

The compatibility of their necessary goals means that only optional goals need to be restricted for the good of necessary goals. We have assumed all along that necessary goals at each biological level take priority over the optional goals at that level. And we have just seen that the necessary goals of spiritual interest take precedence over the optional goals of individual interest. Thus, to see the optimal resolution in this case, we need only consider how necessary goals of individual interest take precedence, in the same way, over optional goals of spiritual interest.

The resolution of this conflict between individual and spiritual interest is the mirror image of the resolution that explained why moral rules takes priority over the pursuit of goals in one’s individual interest. In this case, it explain why rules of justice take priority over the pursuit of goals in one’s spiritual interest.

In both cases, the necessary goals of one biological level take precedence over the optional goals of the other level. That is a symmetrical relationship. And in both cases, that priority determines what is good for reason because it is what contributes to the natural perfection of the whole of which rational subjects are part, that is, the unique combination of reproducing organisms (or primary structures) that have evolved by reproductive causation at two levels of biological at once. (The priorities are depicted in the diagram of the symmetry of individual and spiritual interests).

Rules of justice limit the pursuit of goals of spiritual interest in the same way that rules of morality limits the pursuit of goals of individual interest. In both cases, the necessary goals of one interest are the foundation for limits on the pursuit of goals of the other interest. But they limit the pursuit of necessary goals in a different way from how they limit the pursuit of optional goals. They limit only the means to the attainment of necessary goals, but they can limit the pursuit of certain kinds of optional goals.

The necessary goals of individual interest limit how the spiritual animal pursues its necessary social level goals (just as moral rules limit how the rational subject pursues its necessary individual goals). Though there are certain goals that spiritual animals must attain, there are ways of attaining them that do not keep individual from pursuing their necessary individual goals.

This is not to say that the spiritual animal cannot sacrifice the property and even the lives of individual members in pursuit of necessary goals, such as victory at war and protecting against natural disasters. But those exceptions are already included. Avoiding the risk of war or avoiding mutual defense against natural disasters is not a possible means of controlling conditions affecting individual reproduction for members of spiritual animals, and thus, they are not necessary goals of individual self interest in the first place. Mutual protection from predators (and other natural disasters) and fighting wars have been necessary to the existence of the spiritual animal from the beginning. But individual rights protect the means that spiritual animals use to attain such necessary individual goals within the limits of morality, and no infringement on the rights of individual is justified.

Rules of justice would limit the optional goals that the spiritual animal can choose (just as moral rules limit the optional goals that rational subjects can choose). There may be optional spiritual goals that the spiritual animal is not permitted to pursue because they would conflict with individuals pursuing their necessary individual goals. But that is not a severe limitation on spiritual animals since optional goals are good for spiritual animals only because they are chosen and there are plenty of other optional spiritual goals on which spiritual animals may spend their extra power of rational coordinated action.

For example, the spiritual animal would not be justified in sacrificing the life of one member to use various of his organs to save the lives of several other rational subjects, even though that may maximize the total happiness, because maximizing happiness is an optional goal and it would violate his right to life. (Individuals may, of course, contract with others to set up such an arrangement, and the spiritual animal might be in the position of having to enforce the contract. But what makes the arrangement good is that it serves the individual interests of the participants, and what makes it good for the spiritual animal to enforce it, if it is, is that it is good to keep the contracts one makes.)

There may be conflicts between optional spiritual goals and optional individual goals. They will be limited if spiritual animals pursue optional goals only when there is a consensus about them, because the individuals would all contract, in effect, to cooperate in some social level goal. But if there are conflicts between optional goals on the individual and social biological levels, they do not pose any basic problem about what contributes to the natural perfection of the whole, that is, both the spiritual animal and its members, because optional goals are good for reason only because they are chosen and no matter how much extra power rational beings may have, there are plenty of optional goals to choose from.

The symmetry between the individual and spiritual interests of rational beings makes it clear, therefore, which goals contribute to the natural perfection of the whole of which reason is part, including both the spiritual animal and its members. Rational subjects acting in their individual self interest ought to observe moral rules, and rational subjects acting in their spiritual self interest (that is, in guiding social level behavior) ought to observe rules of justice, including both basic liberties and distributive justice (the economic means to attain necessary individual goals). This is the way to maximize the attainment of all the goals being pursued by rational beings, for by including the attainment of necessary goals on both levels, it makes it possible to pursue optional goals on both level of biological organization. Thus, it is the set of priorities that contributes to the natural perfection of rational beings. Thus, it is good to be moral and to be just.